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REVENUE SHARING AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
Murray L. Weidenbaum

(Editors Note: The following are excerpts of a paper
presented at the Revenue Sharing Symposium, University of Nebraska at Omaha, December 7, 1973. The
author is Mallincllrodt Distinguished University Professor, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr.
Weidenbaum is former Secretary of the Treasury for
Economic Policy in the Nixon Administration and
chairman of the Administrations Committee on Revenue Sharing.)

Introduction: The Basic Purpose
While I was chairman of the Administration's Committee
on Revenue Sharing and attempting to develop support for the
program, I made literall y hundreds of presentations to state and
local government officials and civic groups throughout the nation.
Let me read a short excerpt of the standard part of every talk I
gave, whether it was to a professional group of economists or to
a local Rotary:
"Before getting into the details, one fundamental
point needs to be made. We are not recommending just
another program of sending Federal dollars around the
country; there certainly is not shortage of ways of doing
that already.

"We are proposing a shift of decision-making power
to state and local governments. Revenue sharing is unlike
any existing grant-in-aid program. Under revenue sharing,
the money that state and local governments obtain from
the U.S. Treasury becomes in good measure their money.
For example, revenue sharing money can go into a county's
general fund, and it is up to the county council to decide
how to spend it."
Historical Perspective: Republican Version
The general concept of revenue sharing, that is, sharing the
revenues of the federal government with the other parts of the
federal system, goes back to the earliest days of the Republic.
In his second inaugural address in 1805, President Thomas
Jefferson urged that federal revenue be utilized for a "just repartition ... among the States ... applied ... to rivers, canals, roads, arts,
manufactures, education, and other great objects within each
state."
In 1836 the Congress actually did endorse a form of
revenue sharing when it voted to distribute surplus federal funds
to state governments. The amount actually distributed in 1837
was almost equal to the total of direct federal expenditures for
the year. That magnificent sum of $28 million was used for
a variety of purposes, ranging from capitalizing the state banks
to local debt repayment to public works construction. The

sharing bill was introduced in the Congress. In the Senate, the
bill was sponsored by Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee
in behalf of h imself and 32 of his colleagues. In the House of
Representatives, it was introd uced by Representative Jackson
Betts of Ohio and 75 of his colleagues. Despite the relatively
large number of sponso rs and the growing public support, the
Congressional committees to wh ich the bil ls were introduced
held no heari ngs on them. That the public support was substantial and growing was evident. In May 1969, the Gallup
Poll showed 71 percent in favor of having a percentage of
federal income taxes returned to state and local governments

greater part of the distribution was devoted to what we now
call investments in human resources, notabl y education.
Modern day interest in unconditional sharing of federal
tax revenues with t he states can be t raced to the early 1950's
when the concept began to emerge again in academic ci rcles.
Soon, political leaders were giving it their attention as well.
In 1958, then Congressman Melvin Laird introduced a revenue
sharing bill. Much of the credit for bringing the concept to
more widespread public attention is owed to Professor Walter
Heller of the Uni versity of Minnesota who, while Chairman of
the President's Council of Economic Advisers in the early 1960's,
proposed a detailed revenue sharing plan. The plan was developed
in cooperation with Dr. Joseph Pechm an of the Brookings
Institution, who headed a task force to develop more fully the
specific outlines of a proposal. The result was often called the
Heller-Pech man Plan.

for use as they saw fit. A Gallop survey conducted in January
1971 found that sup port had grown to 77 perce nt. Favorable
reaction cut across party lines, with large majorities of Democrats {77 percent), Republicans {81 percent), and Independents
{73 percent) al l in favor of the plan.
In February 1971, Senator Baker and 38 cospo nsors
introduced the General Revenue Sharing Act of 1971. The
House version was introduced by Congressman Betts and
140 cosponsors. We had worked out the details of the new
and more generous proposal carefully with representatives
of t he major national associations of State and local officials,
incl ud ing the National Governors Conference, the National
Legislative Conference, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the
National League of Cities, the Natio nal Association of Co unt ies
'
an d the International City Manageme nt Association.
The precise formulas contained in the 1969 bills were
modified to provide a larger share to local govern ments, approximately one-half. The general "no str ings" approach was continued. Despite forecasts t hat Congressional hearings would mere ly
"kill" the revenue sharing idea, the extensive hearings held in
1971 by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of
Representatives revealed the very stron g support for the proposal. Several impo rtant mod ificatio ns were made in the course
of the extended Congressional deliberations.

The Heller-Pechman Plan was never proposed by the
Johnson Adm inistration. Yet interest in the idea continued.
By 1968, su pport had grown to the point that both party platforms contained specific revenue shari ng proposals. During the
campaign, candidate Richard Nixo n pledged, "I plan a streamlined Federal system with a return to the states, cities, and
commu ni ties of decision-making powers rightfu lly theirs." 1n
Apri l 1969, while outlining h is first legislative program, President
Richard Nixo n called for " ... a start on sharing the revenues of the
Federal Government, so that other levels of govern ment...will
not be caught in a co nstant fiscal cri sis." You wil l note a duality
of justifications which continues to this day: the political science
concern with the decentralization of governmental power, and
the closely rel ated conce rn of the economists over the adequacy
of the financial base for state and local governme nt.
The next important step occurred in July 1969. The
President called to the White House a representative and bipartisan grou p of Governors, Mayors, and county offi cals to
assist the Admi ni stration in developing a spec ific approach to
revenue shari ng. We reached agree ment on the basic pri nciples:
1. An auto matic distri bution each year of a designated
portion of the fede ral income tax base, based on objective
criteria spel led out in law.
2. An equ ita bl e sharing of the money among State and
local governments, also spelled out in clear formulas contained
in federal law.
3. "No strings" or restrictio ns on the use of the money .
4. Incl usion of all ge neral-purpose local governments,
regardless of size or loca tion .
The four th point represe nted new gro und in the development of revenue shari ng--the inclusion of counties, cities, towns
and other "general-purpose" loca l governmen ts. Most of the
earlier approaches were Iimited to state governments. The July
1969 agreeme nt was a fundamen tal political com promise between
the respective demands of states and local ities. Their joining
forces on the subject of revenue sharing was to provide the
essential political support during the protracted congressional
considerations of revenue sharing legislation.
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Impact of Congressional Changes

that the local share only be used for designated "priority" areas,
whic h notably exclude welfare and ed ucation. The areas
"blessed" by the Congress comprise public safety, envi ro nmental
protection, public transportation, health, recreation, libraries,
social services, and capital outlays. That change is undesirab le
on both co nceptual and practical grounds. Conceptually, such
program "strings" violate the basic notion of putting the
respo nsibi li ty for allocating and spending the funds right on the
local gove rn ments receiving the money. If the citizens do not
like how the reve nue shari ng money is being spent, they know
exactly who to blame and hold accountab le--a nd defeat, if t hey
wish, at the next election.
At the practical level, limi ti ng the local two-thirds of the
reve nue sharing mone y to specific priority areas, no matter
how worthy those areas may be, multiplies the unproductive
ove rhead and paper shuffling that revenue sharing is designed
to cut down. Each local ity is having to set up an accounting
system to show the inevitable federal auditors that th e revenue
shari ng money is being spe nt for parks or sewers or some other
designated local activity that the natio nal legislature has ruled
to be a priority in every locality. Woe unto the unfortunate
local gover nm ent who is caught using a penny of the money for
what by de fau lt Congress must consider low priorities of local
government--such as the pub Iic schools.
What Revenue Sharing May Accompli sh

A further increase was made in the local share to twothirds of the total. In view of the greatly improved financial
conditions of state governments during the last few years, that
seems to have been a desirable change. Yet, the revised geographic distribution formulas represent more change than improvement. The Administration's proposal went to great pains
to take into accou nt the great di versity among the states. That
is, in some states--notably Hawai i--the state gove rnment bears
the burden of financing and carrying out the great bul k of the
government functions, rangi ng from welfare to education.
Under the original approach, such a state government
would receive an above-average share of the funds goi ng to the
state--far more than one-third. In contrast, in a state such as
New York--where local governments carry out a much larger
range of governm ent functions, including welfare and education
--the state governmen ts would receive a below-average share of
the revenue sharin g funds distributed to that state. By ignoring
the wide vari ations in t he allocation of responsibilities between
individual states and their local sectors, the congressional version
of revenue sharing loses a good deal of th e equity embodied in
the earlier version.
A five-year f ixed dollar amount was substituted for the
earl ier plan to disburse permanently and automatically a predesignated share of the personal income tax base. During
a five-year period, the Congress should have adequate opportunity to review the wisdom of its actions. Also, it was argued
that such a reasonably long period--i n contrast to the typica l
12-month appropriation enacted by the Congress--would enable
the state an d local governments to make re latively long-term
plans for the use of the revenue sharing funds. Because the
legislation is both an authori zation and appropriation act,
it provides considerabl y more assurance to the recip ients than
the annuall y-appropriated grant-i n-aid.
It does seem, however, that the five-year limitation has
restrained localities in making their allocation of funds. A
recent survey of Southwestern states, for example, reveals
that a large portion of the local funds is being used for capital
projects. Apparently, localities are reluctant to incorporate the
reve nue sharing fu nds into their operating budgets because of
thei r uncertai nty over the continuation of the program beyond
1976.
A survey of local officials in the spring of 1973 by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovern mental Relations revealed
a similar pattern of response. One question that they asked was,
"Did un certainty about the future of revenue sharing have an
important bearing on th e way your government decided to
spend its revenue sharing fu nds?" Approximately half of the
local officials replying stated that the uncertainty did have
an important bearing on the way in which they spent the money.
This is borne out by a follow-up question as to whether the
uncertainty influenced the local offi~ i als to use the money for
capital outlays and o ther non-recurring expenses. The answer
in this case was overwhelmingly, "yes".
Perhaps the most unfortunate change is the requirement

As it has been just about one year since the fi rst revenue
sharing paymen ts were made, it obviously is premature to
attempt any definitive evaluation of the program. Nevertheless,
I would like to speculate as to the more likely results.
First and most obvious, revenue sharing can be expected to
foste r the attainment of its basic objective, to increase the
relative im po rtance of the state and local portion of the public
sector of the Un ited States at the expense of t he federal. In the
words of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, the legislation provides "a very definite tilt" in the
balance of fiscal federa lism, away from centralized policy
making and toward matching needs and resou rces at the State
and local levels.
To some degree--the state-of-the-art does not enable us
to calibrate it precisely--direct federal employment, purchases,
and other outlays will be less than they likely wou ld have been
in the absence of revenue sharing. Conversely, the em ployment,
procurements, and other expenditures by state and local governments will be larger than they otherwise wou let have been.
And the greater relative importance of state and local government wi ll have occurred in a qualitative as well as quantitative
sense. More of those expenditure deci sions will be made by
state and local officials rather t han by the Congress in voting
grants-in-aid or by federa l person nel adm in istering the aid
programs.
To a modest extent, some of t he smaller and middle-size
local governm ents will obtain a more equitable share of the
total amount of federa l financia l assistance ava ilab le to state
and local governments. This will be particularly true for those
now lack ing staffs wise in the ways of federal government
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gran ts-in-aid and general revenue sharing is that the former works
through both the "income" and the " price" effects, whi le the
latter works only through the " income" effects. That means that
gra nts- in-aid provide a double incentive to increase spending by
state and local governmen ts. First and similar to reven ue shari ng,
they increase the revenues or income of these governmental
units, thus enabling them to spend more. But grants-in-aid have a
second effect--they lower the price of certain categories of public
goods.
For example, a 50-50 match ing gran t on a $5 mi llion
li brary means that it on ly costs the county or city $2~ mill ion
to build the library. At the lower price, the demand is higher.
Few can resist the argument that our city will " lose" the federal money if we do not match it. Not only is the local "price"
of the aided public goods thus reduced in relation to other public
undertaki ngs, but in relation to private goods. Thus, grants-inaid tend to encourage a greater amou nt of purchases of pu blic
goods (and hence a larger publi c sector) by alteri ng the relative
prices of pu bli c goods vis-a-vis private goods.
Revenue sharing does not have that "price" effect. If a
county wan ts to bui ld a $5 mil lion library, it will have to pay
the ful l $5 million. Even if the $5 million is all taken out of
the revenue sharing fun d, there wil l be ful l citizen knowledge
that the money could have been used for another pu rpose, an d
perh aps foregoing the need for a tax increase.
Also, gran ts-in-aid--aga in unlike reven ue sharin g--tend to
encourage wasteful or low yield undertaki ngs, because of the
federal matching money. In this day of cun<.:~rn with benefit/
cost analysis, let us assume a program whose benefits to society
are less than the costs to society--say benefits to $800 and costs
of $1,000, with a benefit/cost ratio of 0.8. Should such a project
be underta ken?
The real isti c answer is that it depends--it depends on who
gets the benefits and who pays the costs, and of cou rse on who
makes the decisions. If in our hypothetical example, there is a
50 percent matching grant available from a federal agency, the
locali ty may fi nd that the pertinent benefit/cost ra ti o for it is
quite different. If the locality will stand to gain the $800 in
benefits but only have to pay one-h alf of the $1,000 of costs,
the pertinent benefit/cost ratio fo r local decision-makers is not
an unfavorab le 0.8 bu t a rather attractive 1.6 ($800 of benefits
to $500 of local costs). It is not surprising, hence, that local
interests continue to push so strongl y fo r federal projects in
their area, even quite marginal ones, so long as th e national
taxpayer will subsidize them. Again, revenue sharing is an
attractive altern ative to that unhappy state of affai rs.
It should be noted that the recent discussion of state and
local surpluses seems to have been overblown. Over half of the
surplus in 1972 was earn ed by state and local retirement funds,
money which is not available for general expenditures. The cyclical recovery in the national economy and the initial large retroactive pay ment of revenue sharing help to explain the remainder.
In time t hese tem porary surpl uses are likely to be reduced
in favor of a combination of higher state and local di sbursemen ts
and lo wer taxes. Fundamentall y, the question is whether the

"gran tsmanship," bu t who wi ll receive their reven ue sharing
all otments auto maticall y.
A sizeable pro portion of co mm unr tres with pop ulatio ns
between 10,000 and 20,000 repo rt that they have never even
applied fo r federal ai d an d that the detailed informati on
requi red in making appl ication fo r many programs has deterred
them. Eve n some of the larger cities say they have given up
applying for relative ly small grants because of the great paperwork burden.
On balance, it can be an ti cipated that the total fl ow of
federal di sbursemen ts to state and local governments will be
greater than they o therwise wo uld have been. That is, even
tho ugh some of revenue sharing may be at the expense of
foregoi ng a greater increase in grants-in-aid than we would
otherwise witness, much of the "opportu nity cost" of revenue
sharing will be a slower growth than otherwise would be the
case in other federal programs. Hence, the net effect of general
revenue sharing wil l be to ex pand state and local revenues.
We should note, however, that 1972 was the second year
in a row th at there was virtuall y ze ro po pulatio n growth in the
number of federal categorical aids. Several factors were at
work, including Presidential vetoes, the enactment of general
revenue sharing, and a general ly unfavorable climate fo r new
government spending progra ms.
In do llar terms, federal disbursemen ts for grants-in-aid
merely sho wed a slowing of what has been a remarka bl y rapid
growth trend in the last fe w years. Fro m a total of $36 billion
in the fiscal year 1972, these outl ays rose to $38 bil lion in fiscal
1974. There is no assurance that these levels wi ll be achieved-but the talk of who lesale slashes and cutbacks just is not
evident in the available num bers. It should readily be admitted,
however, that the current data in th e national inco me accounts
are quite confusing. Attentio n has been foc using o n the reported
decline in to tal federal grants- in-aid (including revenue sharing)
fro m $46 billion in the fourth quarter of 1972 to a rate of $41
billion in the first half of 1973. The decline is simpl y the effec t
of paying out all of the 1972 contrib ution for general revenue
sharing late last year and earl y this year. The annual data clearl y
reveal the upward pattern of federal aid, from $24 billion in
1970 to $38 billion in 1972 and to the $41 billio n rate th us
far this yea r.
Almost paradoxically, the total public sector is likely to be
smaller as the result of revenue sharing than it wo uld have been
in its absence. The state will no t wither away, no r eve n will total
government spend ing (by all levels of government in the United
States) decline. Rather, the growth will be smaller than would
otherwise be the case. The reason for this is th at, indirectly,
some of the revenue sharing money will be used fo r reducing
state or local taxes or more likely to slow down what has been
the very ra pid growth of these tax sources. One recent study
estimates that, on the average, annual fl ow of $5.5 bill ion of
general revenue sharing wil l result in increased state and local
ex pen ditures of about $2-3 billion. The remainder is li kely to
be devoted to tax reducti on.
To an economist, a key technical di fference between
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local governments.
A major complication in analyzing the effects of revenue
sharing is the fact that man y other changes may be occurring
in federa l programs at the same time. For example, a re lated
aspect of the Nixon Administration's New Federalism is an effort
to consolidate many of the specific categorical ai ds to state and
local government into fewer and broader grants, also eliminating
matching requirements in most of those cases.
Unfortunately, the administration has labeled this effort
"special revenue sharing." It is, however, separate and d is tinct
from general revenue sharing. Many supporters of the revenue
sharing concept do not agree with elim inating the ind ividual
grants-in-aid--such as model cities and urban renewal--which have
been iden tified with the Great Society and earlier Democratic
Administrations. Some of them believe that state and local governments will be less responsive to the needs of minority grou ps
and the poor. In any event, it is not necessary to endorse, or to
reject, the so-called special revenue sharing proposals in order
to view general revenue sharing sympathetically. There is a parallel here with earl ier efforts to link general revenue sharing with
the adoption of a value added tax. For a variety of reasons, the
proposed link between the two was never formally established-even· at the proposal stage.
Through its special revenue shari ng proposals, the Nixon
Administration wou ld replace 70 categorica l programs with
four special revenue sharing funds: urban commun ity development, education, manpower training, and law enforcement.
Budget authority for the first full year of operation is estimated
at $7 bi llio n. Hence, the great bulk of existing grants-in-aid-which are being funded at an annual rate of about $39 billion
--presumably would remain undisturbed.
Other efforts re lated to revenue sharing include the Administration's attempts to streamline the administration of federal
programs by consol idating many of the old- line special-interest
departments into four new ones organized around four major
domes tic purposes of government: community development,
human resources, natural resources, and economic development.
Thus far, the Congress has not approved either the special
revenue sharing proposals or the plans to merge the cabinet
departments.
Instead, the area of major debate appears to have shifted,
at least for the time being, to the question of economy in government. The most dramatic aspect of the new struggle is the
subject of Presidential impoundments ::>f Congressional appropriations. Many Presidents have refused to spend all the funds
that Congress has voted and there is some legislative authority
for exercising such discretion. Nevertheless, the scale of the
impoundments has been exceptionally large and the public
statements accompanying them unnecessarily challenging to
congressional prerogatives.

society prefers its tax reductions and expenditure increases to
occur at the state and local or the national level.
Perhaps one of the most important impac ts of revenue
sharing wi ll be the influence on the structure of dec ision-mak ing
in state and local govern ment, especially to strengthen the position of elected officials. Under the grant-in-aid system, typically
the program department of the state, city, or county looks to
its counterpart in the federal bureaucracy for guidance and
leadership. Where the federal agency provides the larger share
of the funds, such federal influence or contro l may be very
substantial.
Thus, in effect, a state Roads Commission may find itself
more beholden to the Federal Bureau of Public Roads--from
which it receives 90 percent of the cost of interstate highways-than to the governor or state legislature, wh ich provide the
remain ing 10 percent. To a lesser extent, similar relationships
exist between state education departments and the U.S. Office
of Education, between local health offices and the U.S. Public
Health Service, an d so forth.
The revenue shari ng funds, in contrast, are adm inistered
by po pularly elected officials. It is the legislature that will decide
the uses to which the state government's share will be pu t.
Sim ilarly, the city councils and the county commissioners will
exercise the decision-making power over the local shares. Thus,
an important shift of power from executive to legislative
branches may well occur, parallel ing the shift from federal to
state-local decisio n-making.
To the extent that more of the decision-making and hence
action is shifted to the states and their subdivisions, they will be
more capable of attracting high calibre personnel and thus
become more effective at carrying out their functions and progra ms. T he greater financial resources should he lp in both recruitment and retention of good people. I believe that we have seen
o ur most talented students interested in government service all
go to Washi ngton. State or local government was generally dismissed as irrelevant. Revenue sharing will be no panacea, but
it should help to improve the situation.
A related impact is the incentive for special-purpose
distri cts--which have continued to proliferate--to merge into
general-purpose un its. This incentive is provided by limiting local
revenue shar ing pay ments to counties, cities, towns, and other
general-purpose governments. Because the allocation of funds is
based in part on tax effort, counties and cities will benefit by
incorporating special districts, whenever they can. Reducing
the number of overlapping jurisdictions wou ld be a significant
reform of local government.
Inciden tl y, the result of the fede ral auditing requ irement
may well be to strengthen financial and program administration
at state and local levels. The general revenue sharing law provides
that the Secretary of the Treasury r.1ay accept the audits performed by state and local governments of the revenue sharing
funds that they receive if they are considered sufficiently reliable.
The Treasury De partment has indicated that it will rely on an
aud it section of some 20 to 25 people. Such a small force will
onl y be ab le to perform spot checks on a sample of the recipien t

Although the impoundments have upset the supporters of
the programs affected, the entire action pro perly should be
viewed as an aspect of fiscal policy. In this period of substantial
inflationary pressures, restraint on government spending seems
to be an appropriate response. Inevitably, opinions will differ
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on which programs shou ld be cut back, out that is the continu al
struggle over national priorities. It is unforunate that the debate
has clouded t he introduction of general revenue sharing. But as
stated earlier, over the years the operation of revenue sharing
is li kely to mean a slower rate of growth in other federal spending than would otherwise be the case. And despite the ta lk abou t
slashes in civilian programs, the reality is only a modest slowdown in what has been an extremely rapid rate of growth.
A Look Ahead

The Council does not have the authority to allocate the
revenue sharing money. Rather, it is assisting those who do.
Early in its operations, the Council requested the State Department of Community Affa irs to set in motion a program to assist
local governments in providing statistical information to federal
agencies as well as in answering the inevitable questions that are
li kely to arise. The result is a State Office of Revenue Sharing
Assistance.
As the Executive Director of the Texas AC I R put it, "We
want very much to avoid a stream of Texas officials going to
Washington seeking answers, because the mo re questions we ask
of Washington, the more written responses the y will give, many
of which will find their way into the Federal guidelines."
The Texas approach may not be necessarily desirable or
wo r ~ab l e in other regions. But, in general, the "extra mile" that
state and local official s may walk in carrying out t he spirit as
well as the letter of revenue sharing is likely to be a very good
investment. It should be recalled that many members of the
Congress had and contin ue to hold an agnostic view of the desirabi lity of yie ldi ng the responsibility over the disbursement of a
portion--albeit a modest part--of federal revenues to another level
of government. Hence efforts to reduce the flexibility and discretion available to state and local officials in carrying out the
revenue sha ring experiment can be expected from time to time.
The legislation itself contains restrictions that do viol ence to the
basic concept, notably the limitation of local expenditures to
designated priority areas. The U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmen tal Relations anticipa tes that th e Appropriations
Committees will make another effort to convert revenue sharing
to an annual basis, thus eliminating the five-year assurance.
To put it simply but accurate ly, unl ess sta te and local governments, and their citizens, an d their associations, take great
pains to minimize waste and inefficiency in the revenue sharing
disbursements, more rather than fewer restrictions can be
expected to be written into the legisla tion in the future. Despite
impressions to the co ntrary, the Congress has been know n to cut
back and on occasion even to eliminate fede ral spending
programs that lose public support.
But I want to end on an optimistic note. For th~ next
five years, the Nation will be witnessing not on ly the di sb ursem~nt of $30 billion, but also one of t he most impor tant efforts
to strengthen the institutions of the American society. If there
is any lesson to be learned from the past, including the very
rece nt past, it is the need for a free an d strong nation to have
a variet y of centers of power, resources, and discretion in the
formu lation and exec uti on of public policy. Revenue Sharing
may well turn out to be a vital contributor to t he development
of that more decentralized stru cture of the public sector which
will enable our society to continue to cope with a great variety
of external pressures and domestic stresses. Revenue sharing is,
after all, one of the few programs in American history which is
overtly designed to he Ip achi eve the ofte n neglected portion of
the preamble to the Co nstitution--t he stirring part referring to
"forming a more perfect Union."

The modern public sector which is emerging in advanced
nations requires a variety of mechanisms and organizations in
order to carry out national po licies. Excessive reliance on any
single mechanism--whether it be contracts to gove rnment-oriented corporations or grants-in-aid to state and local government
--often tends to weaken the mechanism or to dilute the effectiveness of public policy. Seen in this light, revenu e shari ng is
a useful addition to the mechanisms which the mod ern state,
particularly a federal one, can uti li ze in conducting the public
business.
Whether revenue sharing is a one-time experiment or a
conti nuin g commitment will depend, in very large measure, on
how the nation evaluates the effectiveness of the revenu e
sharing money in comparison with the other mechan isms
avai lable for disbursing federal funds and helping to achieve
national objectives. Thus, ultimately, the success of the program
will depend on the wisdom of program choices and on the
effectiveness of program execution on the part of th e states and
local ities usi ng the money.
Although it can be hoped that the exampl es will be few
and minor, from time to time there wi ll bound to be reports
of some stupid or wastefu l instances in the use of revenue
sharing money and per haps even some real "horror stories " of
actual graft and corruption. Unfortunately, honesty and good
judgment cannot be legislated--and th at has been so amp ly and
recently demonstrated at all levels of gove rnment and in both
the public and private sectors.
To be sure, it is encumbent upon state and local officials
to avoid wh at has been called "FTC ex penditure"--funds go ing
for frivol ity, thi every, and chicanery. But it will take more than
that to make the revenue shari ng experiment a success. It wi ll
be necessary to show the citize nry that the $30 bill ion of
federal tax reven ue that wi ll be allo cated to state and local governments over the five-year period, by and large, will be more
wisely spent than if the su ms were merely added to t he budgets
of federal agencies. That is clearly a challenge to t he abili ty of
state, city, and cou nty government throughou t the nation and
it is likely to require some positive action. The state of Texas is
an example of o ne of the few areas that is developing a comprehensive approach to th is important question.
In late 1972 Texas established a Revenue Sharing Counci l
to promote state and local cooperation in the reven ue shari ng
program. The Governor serves as chairman of the Cou ncil ; the
other members are three city officials, three county officials,
the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the State Comptroller.
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Ralph H. Todd

The findings of this paper were presented at the Revenue Sharing Symposium
at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, December 8, 1973.

Introduction

survey.

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 provides the means to return $30.2 billion of federal fu nds to state
and local governments. It is estimated th at the City of Omaha
will receive $25 million of these funds during th e five year
program. There are few strings attached to the use of such funds,
however, local governments must spend the allocations within
designated priority expenditure categories. These categories are
public transportation, public safety, environmental protection,
recreation, libraries, social services for the aged and poor, fina ncial administration, and ordinary and necessary capital expenditures.
To determine what peo ple of Omaha feel to be the expenditure category with the highest priority, a community wide
survey was carri ed out by the Center durin g th e period November 26, to December 5, 1 <J73 . l{esponses were o btained fro m 744
me n and women via telephone interviews. Rando m sampling
techniques were used in t he design and execution of the sa mple

Major Findings
Data from the survey were tabulated on an aggregated
basis as we ll as by age, sex, ed ucation, income and area of residence. The following conclusions were drawn: (1) The majority of Omahans (81 percent) approved of the revenue sharing
program. (2) Omahans think public transportation, public safety,
and social services for the aged and poor were the most important expenditure categories. (3) Financial administration, libraries and recreation were considered least important. (4) On the
basis of statistical tests, no signifi cant differences were fo und
among the three most important expenditure categories) (5)
Similarly, no signi ficant differences were fou nd in terms of the
ran king of the most important expenditure category by age, sex,
and area of residence. However, significant differences were
fo und by income and education.3 Rankings by total response
and by income an d education are given in Table 1.

TAB LE 1
THE MOST IMPORTANT EXPENDITURE CAT EGOR Y OF GENERA L REVENUE SHA RIN G F UNDS
BY TOTAL SAMPL E, INCOME AND EDUCATI ONA L LEVEL OF R ESPONDENT

Under $8,000

Category*
Percent
Public
Transportation

Rank

Educationa l Level

I nco me Level

Total Sample

Percent

$8 .000-$12 ,000

Ran k

Pt!rcent

Rank

Over $ 12,000
Percent Rank

Under 12 Years
Percent

Rank

Over 12 Years

12 Years
Percent

Rank

Percent

Rank

26.75

1

25.78

2

26.21

2

29.81

1

20.31

3

23.02

2

32.68

1

Protecti on

9.01

5

5.26

5

8.47

5

12.45

4

7.03

5

7.91

5

10.47

5

Pub Iic Safety

26.08

2

23.16

3

30.65

1

23.40

2

2 1.09

2

32.01

1

23.05

2

22.85

3

30.53

1

16.53

3

23.02

3

32.81

1

20. 14

3

20.66

3

11.96

4

11 .58

4

14.92

4

7.55

5

15.63

4

11.87

4

10.78

4

1.67

6

1.05

7

1.61

6

2.26

6

1.56

6

2. 16

6

1.50

6

1.13

7

1.56

6

2. 16

6

0.30

8

0.00

7

0.72

7

0.60

7

Environment al

Socia l Services
for Aged and Poor
Health
Recreation
L ibraries
Financial

7

1.21
0.54

8

1.58

6
7

1.05

7

1.21
0.40

8

0.38

8

Administr<Jtion
Number of
Respondents

744

190

248

*No dist inction is made between operating and capit al expendi t ures.

7

265

128

278

334

Of particular interest in Table 1 is how people of differe nt
income and education levels rank the expend iture categories.
Those with incomes below $8,000 indicated social services
for the aged and poor as the highest expenditure priority. In contrast, th ose with incomes fro m $8,000 to $12,000 indicated
public safety as most important and those with incomes above
1The author w ishes t o acknowledge the help from Dr. Paul S.T. Lee
of the Center who provided the statist ical computations upon which
analysis was made. Appreciation is also extended to the graduate research
assistants working at the Center who were responsible for carrying out
the in terviews.
2 The computed x2 value for the three most frequently mentioned
most important expenditure categories was 2.5585 (2 d .f.) . The resu lts
ind icate no signif icant difference in ranking of public transportation,
public safety and soc ial services for the aged and poor (95% confidence).
3-rhe computed x2 values were 14.1730 (14 d.f.), 24.2163
(14 d.f.), 30.3734 (14 d.f.). 28.3947 (14 d.f.) and 7.7279 (7 d.f.)

by

area of residence, age, educational level, income and sex. respectively.
x2 values associated with income and ed ucational levels are significant
at the 5% significance level. All other x2 values are not significant.
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$12,000 indicated transportation as most important. A similar
pattern was fo u nd by education level s. Those with less than 12
years of education considered social services for the aged and
poor to be most important; t hose with 12 years of education
considered public safety most important; and those with more
than 12 years of edu cation placed the greatest importance on
Conclusions
Results of this survey should provide local government
with some positive guideli nes fo r allocating revenue shari ng
funds . The timi ng of th is survey (i.e., the survey was conducted
after the energy crisis became well publ icized) undoubtedl y
affected the views that people have in particular towards
envi ron mental protection and pu bli c transportation ex penditures. Since attitudes do change there is a definite need for periodic assessments to be made of commun ity opinion toward local
government expenditure policy. This, in the final analysis,
shou ld lead to an improvement in both the effectiveness and
responsiveness of the elected in carrying out the expressed needs
of t he community at large.
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